False positives

False positives S+B+s+b/

S+B/100m2

100m2

Boxes tested (area)

Success score

Johan

A – C – E (265sq m)

9/16 = 56.3%

0.75%

0.75%

Jullie

B – C – D – E (362.5sq m)

15/20 = 75.0%

0.28%

3.00%

Josse

B – C – E (262.5sq m)

10/16 = 62.5%

1.14%

1.53%

Gilgamesh

A (65sq m)

No mines

0.00%

1.54%

Lothar

A – D (165sq m)

4/4 = 100%

2.42%

3.64%

Respect

B (67.5sq m)

No mines

0.00%

0.00%

Sargon

D (100sq m)

0/4 = 0.0%

1.00%

1.00%

were indicated by the rats (87 percent), while other items scored less frequently (fragments = 53 percent, bullets = 33 percent).
With the exception of Sargon, all rats scored relatively well (mean = 63.3 percent)
with very few false positive indications (mean < 0.8 indications per 100 square metres
[120 square yards] for the major markings S+B and 1.6 for all markings S+B+s+b).
It should be noted that many of the false positive indications given by different rats
were clustered, which might indicate an explosives-contaminated spot.
Although the individual success score might seem low, the overall score on the C,
D and E boxes (those containing mines) was 100 percent after three rats evaluated
a box (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: Mean success score of the sequence of three rats that tested the
five boxes.

The mean time for a rat to inspect a box was 32 minutes/100 square metres (120
square yards), so when a box was inspected by three rats, this was done in 96 minutes. When we include handling and exchanging animals, the total average time to
evaluate one 100-square-metre box (120 square yards) was about 116 minutes.
Conclusions
The test area was a very dense minefield with 20 mines within an area of less than
30 square metres (36 square yards). Besides the mines, the area was highly contaminated with all kinds of war materials (bullets, detonator pins, mine fragments, etc.),
which were also often indicated by the animals, especially the detonator pins. After
three rats evaluated a box, all mines present in that box were scored.
The construction of risk maps based on the indications of the animals seems to be
a very useful tool as 95 percent of the mines were found in the highest calculated risk
area and the other mine in the second highest risk area. Using this method, more than
80 percent of the total area evaluated by the rats could be declared free of mines.
See “References and Endnotes,” page 108
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The mine-detection rat is harnessed and linked to the search line. Two
leashes are connected to the glider to allow manipulation of the animal’s
position in the box from the safe lanes.

Blast
Protection

for UXO Operations Including Demining
by Glenn Miles [ Lockheed Martin UK INSYS Ltd. ]

Mines, UXO and improvised explosive devices
are explosive hazards that have proliferated for
many decades. In a post-conf lict scenario, these
are sometimes known collectively as explosive
remnants of war.1 While global initiatives have
limited the spread of certain types of devices
(especially anti-personnel mines), a considerable
problem still exists and will continue for many
years to come.
Even where loss of life is avoided, remediation
activities such as soil and water decontamination
and the replacement of habitation and infrastructure are subjected to unnecessary risk, delay and
additional costs due to the presence (suspected or
actual) of ERW.
Technologies for the detection of explosive
blast hazards are numerous and range from rakes
to multi-spectral sensor arrays on autonomous vehicles. Technologies for the protection of structures,
materiel and personnel from blast are considerably
less numerous. For such technologies to be attractive they must be simple-to-use, quick-to-deploy and
fulfill several key functions:
• Serve as a means to mitigate the blast from a
single explosive hazard in situ
• Provide blast mitigation for a storage area for
explosive hazards
• Protect materiel, buildings and their occupants in areas close to the site of the explosive
hazard or an explosive hazard storage area
In order to fulfill these functions, any workable solution must have the following essential characteristics:
• Flexibility and ease of use
• Low cost
• High, scalable performance
• Low density
• Very low environmental impact
• Longevity
Here, we show that BlastWrapTM performs exceptionally well against these parameters.

To protect the safety of those working to defuse mines and UXO,
the mine action community spends considerable time and effort on
research and development of protective equipment and neutralization products that mitigate the effects of explosions. The author
introduces a new technology in the form of a wrapping material
that could be used in everything from safe transportation of explosives to blast-resistant garbage bins. Inspired by some good experiences, Lockheed Martin UK INSYS Ltd. has had with a particular
blast mitigation product, this article has been written to expand on
these experiences into an important area, namely the management
of unexploded ordnance.
Figure 1: BlastWrap.
ALL PHOTOS BY GLEN MILES.

Table 3: Success scores and number of false positive indications of the rats in the five test boxes.

BlastWrap Introduction
BlastWrap is a generic blast-mitigation technology
product based on a combination of a compressible
mineral and a flame-quenching salt.2 This mixture
is commonly encapsulated within a semi-continuous
panel made from two layers of formed thermoplastic
comprising a uniform array of sealed compartments.
The result is an adaptable and robust blast-mitigating
wrapping constructed from lightweight, inexpensive
materials (see Figure 1).
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BlastWrap has been used to mitigate against blast in a variety of applications. Military
applications have focused on accident prevention in storage and during transport. Work
has recently demonstrated the effectiveness of BlastWrap to prevent sympathetic detonation between artillery shells, and work is currently underway to design a BlastWrap retrofit
container for large-calibre ammunition.3 In the oil and gas industries, BlastWrap has been
proven to prevent blast damage to oil pipelines.4 Civil-sector applications have focused on
developing blast-proof litterbins (such as the BlastGard MTR range of trash receptacles5)
and on the protection of buildings within Iraq. 6
BlastWrap’s pedigree is predicated on its appliqué nature, such that existing structures
can be transformed into blast-resistant structures via retrofit.
Table 1 describes how BlastWrap fares in terms of the essential characteristics listed above.
Civilian Safety
The development of the MTR litterbin has generated a performance curve for BlastWrap.
The data is summarised in Figure 2. It is conceived that such a device might find use in the
transport and storage of ERW.
EOD Safety
A temporary three-man shelter for protection of explosive ordnance disposal personnel
has been proposed. This structure is designed to be positioned as near as 100 feet from a
2,000-pound (900-kilogram) device. The shelter has the capability to prevent fragment
penetration and eliminate lethal overpressure within the survival area. The possibilities for
EOD usage have subsequently been extended (see below).
Building Protection
Two diverging approaches can be taken when protecting buildings. The most effective
is to provide a barrier between the building and the source of the blast. The effect of the
blast on the building is minimised. Alternatively, blast mitigation that is light and flexible
enough to be used inside the building can be used to reduce the invasiveness of the blast
wave. Although this approach is more discreet and controllable, it still leaves the structure vulnerable to damage that may lead to partial or complete collapse of the building,
depending on the situation. With this in mind, BlastWrap is considered to be part of a
necessarily more complex solution. This type of application has been proposed for use in
Iraq to protect buildings associated with infrastructure.

Munitions Safety
The prevention of sympathetic detonation between artillery shells by BlastWrap suggests a considerable capacity to transmute blast-wave energy over
very short distances (see Figure 3). This is borne out
by the measurement taken from the litterbin trials
(see Figure 2). The reduction in blast-wave energy has
two benefits. First, it reduces the range of lethality of
the blast. Second, it reduces the likelihood and extent
of secondary reactions of nearby explosive devices.
Hence the same function can be used in dividing walls
within magazines or other explosives storage areas to
reduce sympathetic or secondary reaction, as well as
around the periphery of the storage area to reduce the
effect of any explosion on the surrounding area.
UXO Operations with BlastWrap
The operational view of handling ERW is drawn
down into distinct phases, from planning through
reconnaissance and identification to render safe and
disposal operations. Removal and storage of ERW is
also an option. To perform these functions, certain
physical processes must be performed:
• Establishment and maintenance of safe areas
• Establishment and maintenance of demolition
and/or storage areas
• Provision and maintenance of the associated
logistical chain
• Provision and management of the requisite personnel and equipment
• Break-down and close-out procedures
The objective of BlastWrap deployment is to provide a portable blast barrier solution that is capable of
considerable service life and operation in the widest
possible operational situations. These might include

Table 1: The characteristics of BlastWrap.7

Essential Characteristics

Description
The core technology is a granular material that can be used to fill any
void and so conforms to any shape.

Flexibility and ease of use

The standard product (see Figure 1) can easily create flat and
cylindrical barriers.

Low cost

Raw material costs are quoted as $16 (U.S.) per square foot for a
1-inch-thick layer (�140 per square meter for a 25-mm-thick layer)

High, scalable performance

Reduction of overpressure of 50 percent or more has been demonstrated. Multiple layers can be used for large explosive devices or
stores.

Low density

A 1-inch (25-mm) layer has an areal density of 0.6 lbs per square feet
(3 kilograms per square meter).

Very low environmental impact

Materials are non-toxic, as are the combustion products.

Longevity

Will retain performance for more than 20 years.
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Figure 2: BlastWrap litterbin data summary. Figure by Glen Miles.

Dr. Glenn Miles was educated at
Leeds and Cranfield Universities and
studied energetic materials at the
Royal Military College of Science to
obtain a Ph.D. His first job was at the
Atomic Weapons Establishment in
the United Kingdom, where his responsibilities included all of the mechanical testing of polymer-bonded
explosives. He moved to Hunting
Engineering Ltd. (now Lockheed
Martin UK INSYS Ltd.) in 2000.

• An ERW location marker that has blast-suppressing properties, particularly useful for
managing multiple ERW in close proximity
• A mitigant to minimise the damage to equipment resulting from an explosion during
demining
• A blast tent to protect the surroundings during
render-safe operations.
• A semi-permanent blast shield to protect safe
areas and buildings where an explosive event is
possible
• A lagging layer to transform a normal building
into a safe explosive device storage area
• A sacrificial blast-damping device to the impact
of noise and flash associated with the neutralisation of ERW
• Packaging for stored explosive devices
An example is illustrated in Figure 4. This trial is
associated with the characterisation of the MTR litterbin. It is conceived that a similar approach can be
used mitigate the effects of an IED on the surroundings where there is a damage issue, e.g., in a builtup area, in a multi-story building, in the vicinity of a
treasured landmark or building.
See “References and Endnotes,” page 108

Figure 3: LM UK INSYS testing of BlastWrap with
artillery shells.

Dr. Glenn Miles
Lockheed Martin UK INSYS Ltd.
Reddings Wood
Ampthill, Bedford
MK45 2HD / United Kingdom
Tel: +44 1525 843 249
E-mail: glenn.miles@insys-ltd.co.uk
Web site: http://www.insys-ltd.co.uk

Figure 4: Explosive trial of BlastWrap-lined container (courtesy of BlastGard International)
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credible threat to a community or country.
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errata
The editorial staff of the Journal goes to great effort to make sure that what is printed in our magazine is accurate, properly documented and unbiased. However, in Issue 9.1 there were two errors for which we feel we must
apologize. In the staff-written profile of Afghanistan (pages 66-67), our writer misinterpreted something that was written in an earlier article by Patrick Fruchet (http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/8.1/features/fruchet/fruchet.
htm) and we alluded to a conflict, which apparently does not exist. Mr. Fruchet wrote to us to clarify, saying, “Our deminers are NOT in ‘conflict’ with ISAF…” We humbly apologize for this accidental error, and thank Mr.
Fruchet for calling it to our attention. We mistakenly attributed the article, “Mine Action in Yemen An Example of Success” (pages 10-11, 17), to Mansour Al Azi. It was actually written by Faiz Mohammad, UNDP Mine
Action Specialist for the Yemen Mine Action Programme. We apologize to Faiz Mohammad for this error and thank him for letting us know about it.
If you find errors in the Journal of Mine Action or disagree with anything we have published, please send your comments in a “Letter to the Editor” via email to Lois Carter Fay at editormaic@gmail.com.

